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Stochastic Games with Hyperbolic Discounting
Ronald Peeters∗
February 2004
Abstract
In this paper the hyperbolic discounted reward criterion is introduced for stochas-
tic games. For different levels of sophistication an individual may have existence of
a particular type of optimal strategy in a Markov decision problems is shown. Next,
a particular type of equilibrium for hyperbolic discounted stochastic games with
only one type of individual present is shown to exist. From this, the existence of a
particular (delayed-stationary) type of equilibrium for general hyperbolic discounted
stochastic games is obtained.
JEL Classification Codes: C61; C72; C73; D90.
Keywords: Markov decision problem; Stochastic game; Hyperbolic discounting.
1 Introduction
In the economic theory of intertemporal choice, as it is originally formulated by Irving
Fisher and generalized by Paul Samuelson, all individuals behave similarly as they borrow
or lend until the marginal rate of substitution between consumption today and consumption
tomorrow is equal to the interest rate. Strotz (1955-1956) had a critical view on individual’s
behavior in the decision making process, by speculating that individuals act as if their
discount rates vary with the length of time to be waited: individuals tend to “overvalue”
the more proximate satisfaction relative to the more distant ones. When individuals indeed
behave according to this discount function, dynamic inconsistent behavior is likely to occur.
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lands. E-mail: R.Peeters@algec.unimaas.nl.
The Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO) is gratefully acknowledged for their finan-
cial support. In addition the author acknowledges Jean-Jacques Herings, Arkadi Predtetchinski, Kirsten
Rohde and Peter Wakker. The usual disclaimer applies.
1
The inconsistency above can be illustrated by the example coming from O’Donoghue
and Rabin (1999) where an individual is presented a choice between doing seven hours of
an unpleasant activity on April 1 versus eight hours on April 15. If asked on February
1 virtually everyone would prefer the seven hours on April 1. But come April 1, given
the same choice, most of us are apt to put off the work until April 15. Individuals with
sophisticated behavior, however, foresee that they will have self-control problems in the
future and will for instance plan already on February 1 to do the unpleasant job on April
15.
Discounted stochastic games have been introduced by Shapley (1953). He considered
two-person zero-sum finite stochastic games. Shapley proved that such games have a value
and that both players possess optimal stationary strategies with respect to the discounted
payoff criterion. Fink (1964), Takahashi (1964), and Sobel (1971) extended Shapley’s
model to general n-person stochastic games, and proved independently of one another the
existence of a stationary equilibrium. For this general model Haller and Lagunoff (2000)
proved generic finiteness of the number of stationary equilibria. Herings and Peeters (2004)
extended this to generic oddness.
For the limiting average reward criterion that is originally proposed by Gillette (1957),
Mertens and Neyman (1981) proved that every zero-sum stochastic game has a value. For
the nonzero-sum case equilibria are known not always to exist. Thuijsman and Vrieze
(1991) proved that for this class there always exists an initial state such that an ε-
equilibrium exists. Later, various existence results have been obtained, but only under
specific assumptions on the transition and payoff structure. Vieille (2001) proved that
every two-player stochastic game has an ε-equilibrium. For more than two players, it is
still an open question whether all stochastic games possess an ε-equilibrium or not.
Both types of evaluating streams of utilities mentioned above do not capture the notion
of present-biasedness that is described in the first two paragraphs of this introduction. One
type of payoff-evaluation that does capture this behavior of overvaluing the near future in
comparison to the distant future is by hyperbolic discounting. Although this evaluation
criterion has been introduced for individual decision making quite extensively (see Freder-
ick, Loewenstein, and O’Donoghue (2002) and the many references to applications therein)
and for (infinitely) repeated games quite recently and implicitly (see Arribas and Urbano
(2003) and Vieille and Weibull (2002)), it has never been introduced and therefore also not
been studied for the class of stochastic games in general.1
1In fact, implicitly this type of discounting is captured by Shapley’s definition of a stochastic game.
Namely, hyperbolic discounting is equivalent to having the probability that the game ends increasing over
time—which implies that the end of the game gets closer over time (in a probabilistic sense).
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This paper introduces hyperbolic discounting in stochastic games. First hyperbolic dis-
counted stochastic games with one individual, Markov decision problems, are considered.
With an example it is shown that an individual can suffer from the problem of self-control.
An individual that is resolute pre-commits to play a certain strategy and therefore never
suffers, but pre-commitments lead to irrational behavior in later stages. A naive individual
suffers as he will revise its strategy any instance in time and therefore displays dynamic
inconsistent behavior: in future stages he will not play the action as he planned to play at
forehand. An individual who is sophisticated will realize eventual future self-control prob-
lems and therefore decides to play a dynamic consistent strategy. It is shown that resolute
individuals have a delayed-stationary strategy that is optimal; that naive individuals have
a delayed-stationary strategy that is optimal, but will after all play stationary; and that
sophisticated individuals have an optimal dynamic consistent strategy that is stationary.
Finally the many-individual game is studied. First, it is shown that when there are only
resolute individuals present, there exists a delayed-stationary equilibrium. Then, for the
situation with only naive individuals present it is shown that a stationary equilibrium play-
path exists. When only sophisticate individuals are present a stationary dynamic consistent
equilibrium is shown to exist. The paper ends with a small discussion on what happens
when different types of individuals are playing in one hyperbolic discounted stochastic
game. This leads to the conclusion that for any hyperbolic discounted stochastic game an
equilibrium exists that has a delayed-stationary equilibrium path.
Section 2 considers different types of utility evaluations and formulates them explic-
itly. In Section 3 the stochastic game with hyperbolic discounting is introduced. Section
4 concentrates on the Markov decision problem—which is a stochastic game with one
individual—and contains an example that shows that dynamic inconsistency can occur. In
Section 5 the multi-individual case is studied for three alternative situations: one in which
all individuals are resolute, one in which all individuals are naive and one in which all
individuals are sophisticated. Moreover, situations with a combination of different types
of individuals present are shortly discussed on.
2 Utility evaluations
In period k, an individual does not only care about his present instantaneous utility uk, but
also about his future instantaneous utilities uk+1, uk+2, . . .. Let Uk(uk, uk+1, . . .) represent
the individual’s intertemporal preferences from the perspective of period k, where Uk is
continuous and increasing in all components. The individual’s preferences are said to be
dynamic consistent if the relative preference for well-being at an earlier date over a later
3
date is the same no matter when this person is asked.
One standard way to evaluate the stream of instantaneous utilities is by exponential
discounting : for all k, Uk(uk, uk+1, . . .) =
∑∞
κ=k δ
κuκ, where δ ∈ (0, 1) is the discount
factor. Evaluating a stream of utilities by exponential discounting captures the notion of
dynamic consistency. Another way to evaluate the stream of utilities is by limit averaging :
for all k, Uk(uk, uk+1, . . .) = liminfK→∞
1
K−k+1
∑K
κ=k u
κ.
Individual’s preferences are often found to be present-biased (see Thaler (1981)), i.e.
when considering trade-offs between two future moments stronger relative weight is given
to the earlier moment as it gets closer. This behavior can be captured with a sim-
ple two-parameter model that modifies exponential discounting via Uk(uk, uk+1, . . .) =
δkuk + β
∑∞
κ=k+1 δ
κuκ for all k, where δ, β ∈ (0, 1) (as it is originally proposed by Phelps
and Pollak (1968); see also O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999) or Frederick, Loewenstein, and
O’Donoghue (2002)). The parameter δ represents long-run, dynamic consistent discount-
ing; the parameter β represents a bias for the present—how you favor now versus later. For
β = 1 this type of discounting is equivalent to exponential discounting. But β < 1 implies
present-biased preferences: the person gives more relative weight to period κ in period κ
than she did in any period prior to period κ. This way of discounting is also referred to as
hyperbolic discounting.2
The present-biasedness exhibits a specific type of dynamic inconsistency depending on
the level of sophistication in behavior (see the example in Section 4). Individuals who
are sophisticated foresee that they will have self-control problems in the future; individuals
who are naive do not foresee these self-control problems but do not make pre-commitments
to their behavior; and finally individuals that are resolute do also not foresee future self-
control problems but do make pre-commitments (see O’Donogue and Rabin (1999a and
1999b), and Harris and Laibson (2001)).
3 Stochastic game with hyperbolic discounting
A finite stochastic game with hyperbolic discounting is given by the tuple
Γ = 〈N, Ω, {Siω}(i,ω)∈N×Ω, {ui}i∈N , π, δ, β〉,
in which N denotes the finite set of players, Ω the finite set of states, and Siω is the finite
set of actions that player i has at its disposal in state ω ∈ Ω. The instantaneous payoff to
player i in state ω when the players play sω = (s
i
ω)i∈N is given by u
i(ω, sω). The probability
2Or discrete-time quasi-hyperbolic discounting as it is called in Harris and Laibson (2001).
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of going from state ω to state ω̄ when the players play sω is given by π(ω̄ |ω, sω). The
players are allowed to randomize their actions. Both the instantaneous payoff-function and
the transition mapping are extended multi-linearly. Players maximize the total stream of
expected payoffs, where the future payoffs are discounted by discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1) and
where the distant future—as opposed to the near future—is further discounted by discount
factor β ∈ (0, 1).
The game proceeds as follows. Each player i selects at the initial state ω0 an action
σiω0 ∈ Σiω0 = ∆(Siω0). Then two things happen, both depending on the current state ω0
and the action choices σω0 = (σ
i
ω0)i∈N :
(1) player i earns ui(ω0, σω0), and
(2) the system jumps to the next state ω1 according to the outcome of the chance ex-
periment given by π(· |ω0, σω0).
Subsequently, in the next period, all players are informed about the previous actions chosen
by the players, and of the new state ω1. In this next period, the above procedure is repeated,
starting from the state ω1.
The most elementary type of strategy one can formulate is a strategy which is a series of
actions that depend on time, state, and history (of states revisited and the actions realized).
Such a strategy is called a behavior strategy. Given initial state ω and a combination of
behavior strategies σ, the stream of expected payoffs is evaluated by
U i(ω, σ) := U i0(ω, σ) + β
∑∞
k=1δ
kU ik(ωk, σ),
where U ik(ωk, σ) denotes the expected instantaneous utility at stage k. Here, U i(ω, σ)
equals the total hyperbolic discounted expected payoff of player i with discount factors δ
and β, the starting state is ω and the strategy-tuple σ is played. Since the state and action
spaces are assumed to be finite, U i(ω, σ) exists. A combination of behavior strategies σ
is a Nash equilibrium if and only if σi is a best response to σ−i for all i ∈ N , where the
superscript ‘−i’ is used to indicate player i’s opponents behavior strategies. So, formally,
σ is a Nash equilibrium if for given initial state ω0
U i(ω0, σ) ≥ U i(ω0, σ−i, σ̄i),
for any behavior strategy σ̄i of player i and for all players i ∈ N . A combination of behavior
strategies σ is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium if it constitutes a Nash equilibrium for
every subgame.
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A Markov strategy is a strategy that does not depend on history, but on time and state
only. A stationary strategy refines the Markov strategy in the sense that a stationary strat-
egy does not depend on time, thus on the state only. The two strategic refinements induce
refinements on the equilibrium concept. A Markov (perfect) equilibrium is a Nash equilib-
rium in Markov strategies. Similarly, a stationary (perfect) strategy is a Nash equilibrium
(and also a Markov (perfect) equilibrium) in stationary strategies. The word ‘perfect’
within the brackets is active if the equilibrium is an equilibrium in every proper subgame.
For a stationary equilibrium this perfectness condition is equivalently to being a Nash
equilibrium for any possible initial state. To that end, imagine that some states might
not be accessible from certain initial states. In the remaining of this paper, although not
mentioned explicitly, all equilibria referred to are perfect.
4 One player: Markov decision problem
A stochastic game with only one player is a Markov decision problem and can be denoted
by
Γ = 〈Ω, {Sω}ω∈Ω, u, π, δ, β〉.
In Figure 1 a Markov decision problem is displayed where in the first state the individual
can decide between the options T (top) and B (bottom). If T is chosen, the individual
receives an immediate reward of 1 and is sure to stay in the first state. If B is chosen, the
individual receives an immediate reward of 0 but is sure to be in the second state in the
next period. Whence arrived in the second state, the individual does not have to make
a choice; the player is simply rewarded by 3 and surely returns to the first state in the
subsequent period. Without any loss of generality it is assumed that the first state is the
initial state.
 
 
 
 
 
 
T
B
1

0
→
state 1
 
 
 3
←
state 2
δ = 3
4
β = 3
4
Figure 1: Markov decision problem.
Below six possible strategies are listed (only considering these six strategies will be
sufficient for the analysis) with the corresponding payoffs by playing these strategies. In
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brackets the corresponding payoffs in case of standard discounting (when β would be equal
to 1) are given.
T T · · · · −→ 13
4
≈ 3.2500 ( 4 ≈ 4.0000 )
BB · · · · −→ 27
7
≈ 3.8571 ( 36
7
≈ 5.1429 )
T BB · · · −→ 109
28
≈ 3.8929 ( 34
7
≈ 4.8571 )
BT T · · · −→ 27
8
≈ 3.3750 ( 9
2
≈ 4.5000 )
T BT B · · −→ 109
28
≈ 3.8929 ( 34
7
≈ 4.8571 )
BT BT · · −→ 27
7
≈ 3.8571 ( 36
7
≈ 5.1429 )
The payoffs reveal that TBB · · · and TBTB · · are optimal strategies. In fact, any strategy
in which action T is played in the initial state and where B is played when the first state
is the active state is optimal (note to this end that in the second optimal strategy in later
periods T would have been played once the first state is not active). It is easily shown that
when the Markov decision problem is slightly perturbed such that the transition dynamics
is no longer determinate, TBB · · · will be the unique optimal strategy. In each moment
in time the strategy TBB · · · is optimal and therefore the player plans to play TBB · · ·
every moment in time. This leads to the following decision matrix where in any moment
in time (the rows) committing to play the strategy TBB · · · is optimal.
T B B B · · ·
∗ T B B · · ·
∗ ∗ T B
∗ ∗ ∗ . . . . . .

The resolute individual. A resolute individual that can make strategic pre-commitments
would commit playing the optimal strategy TBB · · · and will play action B in all periods
except the initial one.
Theorem 4.1 For all hyperbolic discounted Markov decision problems with a resolute in-
dividual an optimal strategy exists in which the individual plays stationary from the first
period on.
Proof. From the first period on, continuously playing the action of the optimal station-
ary strategy of the underlying Markov decision problem with standard discounted reward
criterion (β = 1) will be optimal. Given this future behavior, the optimal action in the
initial period is easily determined and is not necessarily similar to the action played in all
subsequent periods (see for instance the example above). 
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The naive individual. A naive individual would recognize in the second stage that
succeeding with playing B is not optimal as it is optimal to play T at any instance in time
given that in all future periods B will be played. Therefore, a naive individual will end up
playing TT · · · ·—the diagonal of the matrix above.
Theorem 4.2 For all hyperbolic discounted Markov decision problems with a naive indi-
vidual an optimal strategy such that the individual plays stationary exists.
Proof. If the strategy of playing action σ0 in the initial period and σr in all subsequent
periods is the optimal strategy in the resolute case, then a naive individual will gradually
revise its strategy such that its play path will be always playing σ0. 
The sophisticated individual. Sophisticated individuals will foresee the future self-
control problems that naive individuals do not see. From the perspective of the naive
individual, the sophisticated individual would realize that he would deviate in any instance
and therefore would play T stationary. Knowing that T will be played in all future events,
the optimal action in the present stage is to play B again (to this end consult the list of
strategies and corresponding payoffs above). Apparently, this mode of reasoning leads to
a cyclic process of thought.
One other way to find optimal strategies in infinite horizon models is to extrapolate from
a finite horizon model. Suppose thereto that the game ends after stage K has been reached.
Then in stage K, if the first state would be the active state, playing T is the optimal action.
Regardless of the action that will be chosen in stage K, in stage K − 1, playing B is the
optimal action. Knowing that in the final two stages action B and subsequently T will
be chosen, it is optimal to play T in stage K − 2, as 1 + 3
4
· 3
4
· (0 + 3
4
· 3) = 145
64
> 135
64
=
0 + 3
4
· 3
4
· (3 + 3
4
· 1). Knowing that in the final three stages TBT will be played, action B
is optimal in stage K − 3. The optimal dynamic consistent strategy in the finite horizon
model is easily shown to be BTB · · · BT if K is odd (and the number of periods is even)
and TBT · · · BT if K is even.
The finite horizon analysis above triggers the idea that both TBTB · · and BTBT · ·
are optimal dynamic consistent strategies for the infinite horizon game. And indeed, when
the individual intends to play BTB · · from tomorrow on, it is optimal to play action T
today as 109
28
> 837
224
= 0+ 3
4
· 3
4
· (3+ 3
4
· 34
7
); and when the individual intends to play TBT · ·
from tomorrow on, it is optimal to play action B today as 27
7
> 209
56
= 1+ 3
4
· 3
4
· 34
7
.3 Although
both dynamic consistent optimal strategies are not stationary, they are Markovian as the
strategies do not depend on history but on time only.
3For some numbers consult the list of strategies with corresponding payoffs.
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One possibility left, to have a stationary optimal dynamic consistent strategy is one
using mixed actions. Suppose the individual plays T stationary with probability p. Then
the present value of the stream of payoffs from the second stage on, which depends on the
state, is found by solving:
ν(1, p) = p + 3
4
· (p · ν(1, p) + (1− p) · ν(2, p)) and ν(2, p) = 3 + 3
4
· ν(1, p).
This solves for
ν(1, p) = 36−20p
7−3p and ν(2, p) =
48−24p
7−3p .
So, the present value of the stream of payoffs from the first stage on when the individual
chooses T respectively B in the first period equals
UT = 1 +
3
4
· 3
4
· ν(1, p) = 109−57p
28−12p and UB = 0 +
3
4
· 3
4
· ν(2, p) = 108−54p
28−12p .
The individual is indifferent between playing action T and B in the first stage—and there-
fore willing to play a mixed action—if these two utilities are equal, which is the case for
p = 1
3
. So, the stationary strategy (1
3
, 2
3
) is an optimal dynamic consistent strategy.
Theorem 4.3 For hyperbolic discounted Markov decision problems with a sophisticated
individual there exists a stationary optimal dynamic consistent strategy.
Proof. Suppose that from the second stage on the sophisticated individual plays accord-
ing to the stationary strategy ρ̄ = (ρ̄ω)ω∈Ω. Then the present values of the (standard)
discounted stream of payoffs from the second stage on for each possible state that is met
in the second stage, satisfies
ν(ω, ρ̄) = u(ω, ρ̄ω) + δ
∑
ω̄∈Ω π(ω̄ |ω, ρ̄ω) ν(ω̄, ρ̄) (ω ∈ Ω).
In vector matrix notation we can write the equations above as
ν(ρ̄) = u(ρ̄) + δ π(ρ̄) ν(ρ̄).
So,4
ν(ρ̄) = [I − δ π(ρ̄)]−1u(ρ̄).
The optimal response in the first stage against the strategy to play according to ρ̄ in all
future stages is found by maximizing the utility
U(ω, ρ, ρ̄) = u(ω, ρω) + β δ
∑
ω̄∈Ω π(ω̄ |ω, ρω) ν(ω̄, ρ̄).
4The inverse is easily shown to exist as the matrix π(ρ̄) is stochastic and is multiplied by a factor
smaller than 1.
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for ρ. This leads to a best response correspondence B : Σ→ Σ (ρ̄ 7→ ρ). This correspon-
dence is closed, upper hemi-continuous with nonempty convex compact values. According
to Kakutani’s fixed point theorem a fixed point exists. This shows the existence of a
stationary optimal dynamic consistent strategy. 
5 More players: stochastic game
In this section the previous section is extended to the multi-player case. This exten-
sion is not trivial as the current setting allows different types of individuals to interact.
First three classes of stochastic games are considered to each of which a special subsec-
tion is devoted: (1) with only resolute individuals, (2) with only naive individuals, and
(3) with only sophisticated individuals. For each case common knowledge in behavior is
assumed, i.e. for the case with only resolute (naive/sophisticated) individuals, the reso-
lution (naivety/sophistication) is common knowledge among the individuals. Finally, in
the fourth subsection all types of individuals come together. Important here is the com-
mon knowledge of all individuals being either resolute, naive, or sophisticated and do not
change type during the play of the game. It is however not necessary to now exactly who
has which type.
5.1 When there are only resolute individuals
From Theorem 4.1 it follows that there might not exist a stationary best response against
opponents playing stationary, as the decision problem of finding the optimal strategy
against the opponents is Markovian due to the stationarity induced by the opponents
behavior. But an optimal strategy that is stationary from the first period on exists. Let
us call such a strategy delayed-stationary. Notice that this type of strategy is Markovian,
since the strategy does not depend on the history, but only on state and time.
Theorem 5.1 For hyperbolic discounted stochastic games with resolute individuals there
is a delayed-stationary optimal best response against opponents playing delayed-stationary.
Proof. Given that all opponents play delayed-stationary, the optimal response is to play
stationary on the second period on, as from the second period on the game is equivalent
to a stochastic game with (standard) discounted reward criterion. So, there is a delayed-
stationary optimal response against opponents playing delayed-stationary. 
In line with other refinements of the equilibrium concept, a delayed-stationary equilibrium
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is defined as an equilibrium in delayed-stationary strategies. Quite naturally, a delayed-
stationary equilibrium is also a Markov perfect equilibrium.
Theorem 5.2 For every hyperbolic discounted stochastic game with resolute individuals a
delayed-stationary equilibrium exists.
Proof. From the second period on, stationary equilibria of the underlying stochastic
game with (standard) discounted reward criterion are part of an equilibrium in the whole
stochastic game with hyperbolic discounting. The decision in the initial period can be
solved by backward induction and is equivalent to a normal form game. From the exis-
tence of both a stationary equilibrium for the underlying stochastic game with (standard)
discounted reward criterion and a Nash equilibrium for the resulting normal form game,
existence of a delayed-stationary equilibrium follows. 
5.2 When there are only naive individuals
Theorem 5.3 For hyperbolic discounted stochastic games with naive individuals there ex-
ists an optimal strategy against opponents playing stationary that gives rise to a stationary
strategy in realization.
Proof. From Theorem 4.2 it follows that, given that all opponents play stationary, there
exists an optimal response that is delayed-stationary. As the individual is naive, he will
gradually revise its strategy in every period. This leads to a stationary play-path. 
Theorem 5.4 For every hyperbolic discounted stochastic game with naive individuals there
exists an equilibrium with a stationary equilibrium-path.
Proof. Let Bi : Σ−i → Σi be the correspondence that assigns to each combination of
stationary strategies of the opponents the stationary play-path that is proved to exist in
Theorem 5.3. This correspondence is closed, upper hemi-continuous with nonempty convex
compact values. The compounded correspondence over all individuals B : Σ→ Σ also has
these properties. Since B is a correspondence from a set that is compact and convex valued
into itself with the properties listed, a fixed point exists according to Kakutani’s fixed point
theorem. Fixed points of the correspondence B are stationary strategy combinations with
the property that there exists an equilibrium having this stationary strategy combination
as equilibrium-path. 
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5.3 When there are only sophisticated individuals
Theorem 5.5 For hyperbolic discounted stochastic games with sophisticated individuals
there exists a stationary optimal dynamic consistent strategy against opponents playing
stationary.
Proof. Given that all opponents play stationary, the decision to respond optimally is a
Markov decision problem. From Theorem 4.3 it follows that a stationary optimal dynamic
consistent response exists. 
Theorem 5.6 For every hyperbolic discounted stochastic games with sophisticated individ-
uals a stationary dynamic consistent equilibrium exists.
Proof. Let Bi : Σ−i → Σi be the best response correspondence of individual i over sta-
tionary (dynamic consistent) strategies only. As claimed in the proof to Theorem 4.3, this
correspondence is closed, upper hemi-continuous with nonempty convex compact values.
The compounded correspondence over all individuals B : Σ→ Σ also has these properties.
Again, applying Kakutani implies the existence of a fixed point and in turn the existence
of a stationary dynamic consistent equilibrium. 
5.4 Mixtures of individuals
From the latter two subsection it follows that in a hyperbolic discounted stochastic game
with only naive and sophisticated individuals present (and common knowledge of this in-
formation), an equilibrium inducing a stationary equilibrium-path exists. Namely, for a
sophisticated individual, given stationary behavior of his opponents, there will be a sta-
tionary dynamic consistent best response. And, for a naive individual, given stationary
behavior of his opponents, any optimal strategy will lead to a stationary strategy in real-
ization.
When we add one resolute individual, this individual will have a delayed-stationary
best response against all other individuals playing stationary. But for the naive and so-
phisticated individuals it will no longer be optimal to play stationary as the resolute in-
dividual does not play stationary (and therefore their private decision problem given the
opponents strategies is no longer Markovian). But trivially, for a sophisticated individual,
given delayed-stationary behavior of his opponents, there will be a delayed-stationary best
response. And, also quite naturally, for a naive individual, given delayed-stationary be-
havior of his opponents, any optimal strategy will lead to a delayed-stationary strategy in
realization. In return, for a resolute individual, given delayed-stationary behavior of his
12
opponents, there exists a delayed-stationary optimal response. This leads to the following
theorem.
Theorem 5.7 For hyperbolic discounted stochastic games an equilibrium exists that has a
delayed-stationary equilibrium-path.
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